The Signal and the noise: Why the messaging app is great for privacy but not for war plans.
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Each participant is sent a separate copy of each message encrypted with their own key.
This is one way that signal differs from WhatsApp e2e in groups. In WhatsApp the server replicates the message out to all clients. It can't read the message but it knows the recipient list. In Signal your phone sends the message several times, so only members of the group know who is in the group.
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The app doesn't matter. Wrong fucking network.
Absolutely right. Messages of the type they sent should never be on a public network whether they are encrypted or not.
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Ok, let's pick the correct App for planning the rebellion.
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TLDR: some government/military official added a reporter to a Signal group were some high profile people were discussing and sharing war plans.
The app's encryption is perfectly fine. It's just clickbait. -
If you can influence others to do so, use the better app. My family, we use Briar.
Around the house? Briar is for chats over bluetooth, unless I'm mistaken.
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Signal is gaining the network effect. Session is not. Don't let perfect be the enemy of good enough.
To be fair, variety makes groups more resilient. If Signal were to ever become compromised somehow, people who use other apps like Session will be okay.
It's not a zero-sum game, either -- people can use Signal and other apps.
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I think there was an article recently about Session devs, first, having their protocol derived from Signal's, second, not knowing what they were doing with that, which would discredit it pretty hard.
Also everything is traceable, it's a question of effort and who you piss off.
You don't know what you are talking about. Just because Session is a fork of Signal doesn't mean it isn't better, but is an improvement. Session adds identity protection and it is decentralized. There is no personal information needed to create accounts; no phone number or email required. There is no metadata storage. Had the Trump cabinet used Session instead of Signal, there would be no evidence to the identities of the individuals messaging each other. Signal requires a phone number to have an account which traces to an identity. The leaked war plans were not from encryption failing, but traceable identities.
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Ok, let's pick the correct App for planning the rebellion.
Bluesky, Lemmy, Revolt, Spark, & Flashes apps
Those each cover a different aspect that will body everyone. We need a US Community on Revolt too not just Lemmy
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Ok, let's pick the correct App for planning the rebellion.
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TLDR: some government/military official added a reporter to a Signal group were some high profile people were discussing and sharing war plans.
The app's encryption is perfectly fine. It's just clickbait.They weren’t war plans. They were attack plans. /s
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Fundamentally the biggest security vulnerability in every peice of software is the end user. It does not matter how intelligently the software is designed, no amount of preparation can handle the users. That is not to say Signal has no security vulnerabilities but almost nothing can stop someone from inviting a random reporter (if they explicitly invited them). Furthermore I have a conspiracy theory of sorts, I dont think it was a mistake. I think Trumps own administration is trying to backstab him. Maybe they had ideas of becoming more powerful, maybe they thought Trump woupd reduce their power, but I feel that the amount of government leaks and just how complicated they are would suggest infighting.
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And if anyone magically finds them, they'll dismiss it as a crazy conspiracy
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4chan is what you need
WarThunder forums has the highest experts apparently
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They weren’t war plans. They were attack plans. /s
️genocide assisting murder plans
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Bluesky, Lemmy, Revolt, Spark, & Flashes apps
Those each cover a different aspect that will body everyone. We need a US Community on Revolt too not just Lemmy
We need a US Community on Revolt too not just Lemmy
Never heard of it before.
What's the elevator pitch?
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And if anyone magically finds them, they'll dismiss it as a crazy conspiracy
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This is one way that signal differs from WhatsApp e2e in groups. In WhatsApp the server replicates the message out to all clients. It can't read the message but it knows the recipient list. In Signal your phone sends the message several times, so only members of the group know who is in the group.
The encryption still works roughly the same, the difference is mostly visible metadata.
Multiple bundles of encrypted message + decryption key & recipient tag for 1 person, or one bundle of the encrypted message and then keys for multiple people & recipients which the server can separate out when relaying the message
(message keys are encrypted to each recipient's keypair*)
*simplified because I can't be bothered to explain how deniability is implemented. Just look up the Signal protocol's ratchet
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The app doesn't matter. Wrong fucking network.
Wrong hardware!
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Absolutely right. Messages of the type they sent should never be on a public network whether they are encrypted or not.
The military does tons of stuff over public networks, the key is using vetted hardware and their own VPN and communication tools which allows complete control over recipients.
No random unaudited consumer devices which might have various exploits known to outsiders, which might fall into the hands of spies, and which DEFINITELY does not have any active security monitoring.
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TLDR: some government/military official added a reporter to a Signal group were some high profile people were discussing and sharing war plans.
The app's encryption is perfectly fine. It's just clickbait.Its not click bait, its a great layman's terms explanation of the app and what it does. This is the kind of article I would send to my parents who are basically tech illiterate when this topic inevitably arises. It also clarifies points that were poorly reported by other outlets, which is necessary to call out, especially in our current informational climate.
