keeping the fediverse human [edited]
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wrote last edited by [email protected]
As a follow up to this post in this community: The Future is NOT Self-Hosted
I have thought about how to set up local, community-hosted fediverse servers that respect privacy and anonymity while still guaranteeing that users joining the server are human-beings.
The reasoning behind these requests is that:
- You want anonymity to guarantee that people won't face repercussions in real life for the opinions they voice in the internet. (liberty of free speech)
- You want to keep the fediverse human, i.e. make sure that bot accounts are in the minority.
This might sound like an impossible and self-contradictory set of constraints, but it is indeed possible. Here's how:
Make the local library set up a fediverse server. Once a month, there's a "crypto party" where participants throw a piece of paper with their fediverse account name into a box. The box is then closed and shaked to mix all the tokens in it. Then, each one is picked out and the library confirms that this account name is indeed connected to a human. Since humans have to be physically present to throw in a paper, it is guaranteed that no bot army just opens a hundred anonymous accounts. Also, the papers are not associated to a particular person that way.
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As a follow up to this post in this community: The Future is NOT Self-Hosted
I have thought about how to set up local, community-hosted fediverse servers that respect privacy and anonymity while still guaranteeing that users joining the server are human-beings.
The reasoning behind these requests is that:
- You want anonymity to guarantee that people won't face repercussions in real life for the opinions they voice in the internet. (liberty of free speech)
- You want to keep the fediverse human, i.e. make sure that bot accounts are in the minority.
This might sound like an impossible and self-contradictory set of constraints, but it is indeed possible. Here's how:
Make the local library set up a fediverse server. Once a month, there's a "crypto party" where participants throw a piece of paper with their fediverse account name into a box. The box is then closed and shaked to mix all the tokens in it. Then, each one is picked out and the library confirms that this account name is indeed connected to a human. Since humans have to be physically present to throw in a paper, it is guaranteed that no bot army just opens a hundred anonymous accounts. Also, the papers are not associated to a particular person that way.
Immediate flaws, I can see:
Cameras (or human observer) undo any sense of anonymity. A bad actor could link participant with account.
What's preventing a MitM attack, where the BBEL (Big Bad Evil Librarian) substitutes the participant addresses with bot addresses?
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As a follow up to this post in this community: The Future is NOT Self-Hosted
I have thought about how to set up local, community-hosted fediverse servers that respect privacy and anonymity while still guaranteeing that users joining the server are human-beings.
The reasoning behind these requests is that:
- You want anonymity to guarantee that people won't face repercussions in real life for the opinions they voice in the internet. (liberty of free speech)
- You want to keep the fediverse human, i.e. make sure that bot accounts are in the minority.
This might sound like an impossible and self-contradictory set of constraints, but it is indeed possible. Here's how:
Make the local library set up a fediverse server. Once a month, there's a "crypto party" where participants throw a piece of paper with their fediverse account name into a box. The box is then closed and shaked to mix all the tokens in it. Then, each one is picked out and the library confirms that this account name is indeed connected to a human. Since humans have to be physically present to throw in a paper, it is guaranteed that no bot army just opens a hundred anonymous accounts. Also, the papers are not associated to a particular person that way.
wrote last edited by [email protected]And what if you don't want to use crypto?
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And what if you don't want to use crypto?
"crypto parties" often refers to key signing parties, i.e. parties where you exchange cryptographic keys. sorry i should have made that clearer
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As a follow up to this post in this community: The Future is NOT Self-Hosted
I have thought about how to set up local, community-hosted fediverse servers that respect privacy and anonymity while still guaranteeing that users joining the server are human-beings.
The reasoning behind these requests is that:
- You want anonymity to guarantee that people won't face repercussions in real life for the opinions they voice in the internet. (liberty of free speech)
- You want to keep the fediverse human, i.e. make sure that bot accounts are in the minority.
This might sound like an impossible and self-contradictory set of constraints, but it is indeed possible. Here's how:
Make the local library set up a fediverse server. Once a month, there's a "crypto party" where participants throw a piece of paper with their fediverse account name into a box. The box is then closed and shaked to mix all the tokens in it. Then, each one is picked out and the library confirms that this account name is indeed connected to a human. Since humans have to be physically present to throw in a paper, it is guaranteed that no bot army just opens a hundred anonymous accounts. Also, the papers are not associated to a particular person that way.
wrote last edited by [email protected]Have you heard of surveillance cameras and facial recognition? If a hostile actor knows in advance that members of a targeted online community will be physically present at a location at a given time, those people will be linked to the community. It doesn't take a lot from then to link specific persons to accounts.
Besides, libraries are having a hard enough time just existing in America. They don't need the burden of protecting the identities of dozens of people and fighting off lawyers and enforcers.
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"crypto parties" often refers to key signing parties, i.e. parties where you exchange cryptographic keys. sorry i should have made that clearer
Ah, Ok!
Thanks for the clarification!
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As a follow up to this post in this community: The Future is NOT Self-Hosted
I have thought about how to set up local, community-hosted fediverse servers that respect privacy and anonymity while still guaranteeing that users joining the server are human-beings.
The reasoning behind these requests is that:
- You want anonymity to guarantee that people won't face repercussions in real life for the opinions they voice in the internet. (liberty of free speech)
- You want to keep the fediverse human, i.e. make sure that bot accounts are in the minority.
This might sound like an impossible and self-contradictory set of constraints, but it is indeed possible. Here's how:
Make the local library set up a fediverse server. Once a month, there's a "crypto party" where participants throw a piece of paper with their fediverse account name into a box. The box is then closed and shaked to mix all the tokens in it. Then, each one is picked out and the library confirms that this account name is indeed connected to a human. Since humans have to be physically present to throw in a paper, it is guaranteed that no bot army just opens a hundred anonymous accounts. Also, the papers are not associated to a particular person that way.
How does the library confirm that the account name is connected to an actual person?
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As a follow up to this post in this community: The Future is NOT Self-Hosted
I have thought about how to set up local, community-hosted fediverse servers that respect privacy and anonymity while still guaranteeing that users joining the server are human-beings.
The reasoning behind these requests is that:
- You want anonymity to guarantee that people won't face repercussions in real life for the opinions they voice in the internet. (liberty of free speech)
- You want to keep the fediverse human, i.e. make sure that bot accounts are in the minority.
This might sound like an impossible and self-contradictory set of constraints, but it is indeed possible. Here's how:
Make the local library set up a fediverse server. Once a month, there's a "crypto party" where participants throw a piece of paper with their fediverse account name into a box. The box is then closed and shaked to mix all the tokens in it. Then, each one is picked out and the library confirms that this account name is indeed connected to a human. Since humans have to be physically present to throw in a paper, it is guaranteed that no bot army just opens a hundred anonymous accounts. Also, the papers are not associated to a particular person that way.
Admin review of account applications in Lemmy works fine. If you ask people to write a bit, it's quite easy to sort out the bots as there are always give-aways. And if people use LLMs to write the responses, then that's on them
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Have you heard of surveillance cameras and facial recognition? If a hostile actor knows in advance that members of a targeted online community will be physically present at a location at a given time, those people will be linked to the community. It doesn't take a lot from then to link specific persons to accounts.
Besides, libraries are having a hard enough time just existing in America. They don't need the burden of protecting the identities of dozens of people and fighting off lawyers and enforcers.
wrote last edited by [email protected]if the group of people registering their account names is big enough, facial recognition doesn't do much, as it can only link the person to one-of-a-hundred-or-thousand account names.
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Admin review of account applications in Lemmy works fine. If you ask people to write a bit, it's quite easy to sort out the bots as there are always give-aways. And if people use LLMs to write the responses, then that's on them
wrote last edited by [email protected]today, yes. it's a very simplistic worldview to assume that AI won't becomes less distinguishable from humans when writing applications in the future, and i don't expect it to hold true
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Immediate flaws, I can see:
Cameras (or human observer) undo any sense of anonymity. A bad actor could link participant with account.
What's preventing a MitM attack, where the BBEL (Big Bad Evil Librarian) substitutes the participant addresses with bot addresses?
wrote last edited by [email protected]Cameras (or human observer) undo any sense of anonymity. A bad actor could link participant with account.
hence the mixing (shuffling) of paper cards before they are being registered. so there's no one-to-one mapping of humans and account names anymore.
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How does the library confirm that the account name is connected to an actual person?
wrote last edited by [email protected]you have to go there in person to cast a piece of paper with your account name on it, similar to a vote in a ballot. it's anonymous because the pieces of paper cannot be associated to a physical human, just like voting ballots are anonymous, but it still transports the information that a human registered this account.
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if the group of people registering their account names is big enough, facial recognition doesn't do much, as it can only link the person to one-of-a-hundred-or-thousand account names.
wrote last edited by [email protected]I don't think you fully comprehend just how many footprints people leave behind on the internet. Users would have to practice perfect opsec -- and I mean completely, absolutely perfect. One mistake, like using an e-mail address or an alias off-site, will link a person to the account. If that person cracks under legal threats, the entire operation is fucked. It's happened before.
Thinking you can solve the issue of privacy with a single idea is simply delusional.
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today, yes. it's a very simplistic worldview to assume that AI won't becomes less distinguishable from humans when writing applications in the future, and i don't expect it to hold true
You can just make the questions more location or theme specific. There is no way a bot will not slip up on stuff like that, and it doesn't need to be 100% fail proof either.
We get a lot of LLM bot applications on our instance, and even if it would get 10x harder, they would be still really easy to spot.
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you have to go there in person to cast a piece of paper with your account name on it, similar to a vote in a ballot. it's anonymous because the pieces of paper cannot be associated to a physical human, just like voting ballots are anonymous, but it still transports the information that a human registered this account.
What's stopping someone making a new account every month this way or going to many different libraries and then just selling the account to bot farm operators?
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today, yes. it's a very simplistic worldview to assume that AI won't becomes less distinguishable from humans when writing applications in the future, and i don't expect it to hold true
wrote last edited by [email protected]Can't help but think about this old XKCD from 2010.
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You can just make the questions more location or theme specific. There is no way a bot will not slip up on stuff like that, and it doesn't need to be 100% fail proof either.
We get a lot of LLM bot applications on our instance, and even if it would get 10x harder, they would be still really easy to spot.
what if we explicitly say to user write something like i am not a robot and i am creating this account with a buch of slurs or some freaky stuff . ai will never write these stuff
