What are the reasons to use Signal over Telegram

[thehobbyist@lemmy.zip]

From what I understand, sealed sender is implemented on the client side. And that's what's in the github repo.

[krash@lemmy.ml]

I really like this explanation. Not many are aware of how telegram was designed to make it as cumbersome for authorities as possible by splitting their data across different nations.

[noxypaws@pawb.social]

Same with telegram though

[tartas1995@discuss.tchncs.de]

Where do you want to place the goal post?

We talked about comparing 2 applications. Commenter wasn't up-to-date and implied a falsehood, I corrected it as it is important for the discussion. Then you talk about something completely else and in context, implied a falsehood, I corrected that as it is important for the discussion. And now you are talking about something completely else again.

Please express your opinion. You can do it in this thread, even if it is off-topic, I don't care, but please stop acting like you are responding to me.

[hadriscus@lemm.ee]

Do you mean the builds published aren't guaranteed to be built from the source that's on github ? isn't there a cryptographic way to ensure that ?

[nexy@lemmy.sdf.org]

Telegrsm is not secure anymore. USA have all the keys of the encriptions of telegrsm.

[doomsdayrs@lemmy.ml]

citation?

[dyskolos@lemmy.zip]

That too. Sadly the restrictiveness was badly abused. Noone really wonders but...that's why we can't have nice things.

[boomkop3@reddthat.com]

Well then use the secret chat if you want your chat to be secret from any prying eyes

[dyskolos@lemmy.zip]

I meant the restrictiveness towards governments. The pesos and Nazis fucked that up, tgram had to do something or have their ill repute grow even more.

[bazoogle@lemmy.world]

If you have a safe, but cannot open it, do you own the contents inside? Signal has no way of accessing your data, I would argue they don't own it.

[bazoogle@lemmy.world]

I wouldn't say USA has all the encryption keys, but the fact that it is actually possible to have a backdoor is reason enough for me to not use it. Signal complies with all search warrants, giving all the data they have to law enforcement. They have never given any data to law enforcement, because they do not have access to it. Telegrams approach is to simply to spread the data to several servers in different countries, so if law enforcement wanted access they'd have to submit requests to each country (some of which wouldn't comply).

[bazoogle@lemmy.world]

The encryption method they use was made up by them, and the chats aren't even end to end encrypted by default. Which I would argue is a larger red flag.

[bazoogle@lemmy.world]

Why use two different apps? I only use Signal, and have gotten so many friends, coworkers, and family to use Signal.

[zak@lemmy.world]

Message history is a valid point. Signal just announced they're fixing it.

Safety number change notifications are probably necessary to maintain Signal's high level of security. The above device linking improvements should make them less frequent, though I'll concede some might consider that a worse UX than an insecure chat with no such notifications.

[wahots@pawb.social]

Pegasus really negates a lot of security too.

[aria@lemmygrad.ml]

How does that work? I wasn't able to find this. Can you find documentation or code that explains how the client can obscure where it came from?

[boomkop3@reddthat.com]

Telegram seems to be a popular option for groups of such orgs. Other apps have the same risks tho. It's a bit if a mess

[aria@lemmygrad.ml]

I think Dessalines most recent comment is fair even if it's harsh. You should understand the nature of a "national security letter" to have the context. The vast majority of (USA) government requests are NSLs because they require the least red tape. When you receive one, it's illegal to disclose that you have, and not to comply. It requires you to share all metadata you have, but they routinely ask for more.

Here's an article that details the CIA connection https://www.kitklarenberg.com/p/signal-facing-collapse-after-cia

The concern doesn't stem from the CIA funding. It's inherit to all services operating in or hosted in the USA. They should be assumed compromised by default, since the laws of that country require them to be. Therefore, any app you trust has to be completely unable to spy on you. Signal understands this, and uses it in their marketing. But it isn't true, they've made decisions that allow them to spy on you, and ask that you trust them not to. Matrix, XMPP and SimpleX cannot spy on you by design. (It's possible those apps were made wrong, and therefore allow spying, but that's a different argument).

[toastal@lemmy.ml]

Not an endorsement of WhatsApp but they aren’t duplicating the metadata everywhere since it is centralized. I believe they run a fork of Ejabberd as well for the platform which is orders of magnitude more scalable & uses less resources than any of the Matrix servers—& they have to me RAM intensive due to how they duplicate that data..